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EXPLORING THE LAW OF LAW TEACHING:
A FEMINIST PROCESS
KATHRYN M. STANCHI*

INTRODUCTION

The question that Jane Baron poses, "what is law?," is an
interesting one for legal scholars and a challenging one for
practicing lawyers, but a critical one for law teachers. Professor
Baron argues that many "law and" scholars describe law as purely
doctrinal, rigid, narrow, and unemotional, in part to set up "law"
as a foil to the discipline that follows the "and."' The question
Professor Baron poses for us is not so much whether law can be
doctrinal, rigid, and devoid of feeling (because law certainly can be
all these things), but whether this is the sum of law-is this all
law is?
This essay gives a perspective on Professor Baron's question
that is informed by my experiences as a legal writing professor. A
primary goal of legal writing is to teach students to think, write
and speak like (good) lawyers. In this way, we share the goal of
most doctrinal courses to teach students how to "think like a
lawyer," but we also teach how to research, write, analyze facts,
and problem-solve like a lawyer. Although legal writing professors
teach doctrine,' we must always go beyond doctrine because in
legal writing the law never exists separately from its human
players and context.3
* Associate Professor of Law, Temple University School of Law.
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the coordinators of the conference for their hard work in putting it together.
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Baron for asking me to comment on her provocative piece and for her advice
and support.
1. Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity,

108 YALE L.J. 1059, 1080-82 (1999).
2. It is useful here to define what I mean when I say "doctrine." As I
understand the term generally and as it is used in Professor Baron's article, it
refers to rules, or what is sometimes called the "black letter law" such as the
holdings of cases, the prohibitions or requirements of statutes, or the words
actually written in the Rules of Evidence or Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. See JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC
AND POETICS OF THE LAW 64-66 (1985). Professor Boyd White notes that once
we take the doctrine and try to apply to anything but the most simplistic fact
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Our methods of teaching are also quite different from most
doctrinal courses. We do not use the case method of law teaching.
In legal writing, students do not learn law solely by reading law;
students learn by doing law. That is, students read and analyze
(hypothetical) client facts, thoroughly research and analyze the
relevant law, reach a conclusion, and communicate that conclusion
and analysis orally and in writing.' Because of this difference in
method, legal writing teachers, in our scholarship and in our
classrooms, are at the forefront of thinking about law pedagogy
and seeking more effective alternatives to the traditional Socratic
and Langdellian orthodoxy of law school teaching.5 Thus, it seems
fitting that a legal writing professor should ask: how can an
exploration of the question "what is law?" help us teach?
Professor Baron's question is germane to law pedagogy
because the principal goal of law schools-to teach students to
"think like a lawyer"--means that professors are teaching
students what law is (and is not). Scholars construct law when
they write about what law is and practitioners construct law when
they practice law a certain way.' Professors are also influential
constructors of law because we have a largely captive, eager and
uninformed audience. We tell our students what law is and they
leave our classrooms and construct law by practicing and writing
about law. So, if we define "thinking like a lawyer" narrowly or
rigidly-as completely and always separate and different from the
"thinking" the students did as non-lawyers-that is what our
students will think law is, and that will influence how they
practice (and therefore construct) law. Thus, Professor Baron's
question should inspire us, legal writing and doctrinal teachers
alike, to think about what we mean when we say we teach law or
"thinking like a lawyer."

pattern, we must look beyond doctrine to reasons, policy, and facts. Id. That
is the primary skill taught in legal writing courses.
4. See, e.g., RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL
WRITING: STRUCTURE, STRATEGY AND STYLE 53-54 (1990). See also Jo Anne

Durako et al., From Product to Process:Evolution of a Legal Writing Program,
58 U. PITT. L. REV. 719, 726 (1997).
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R. Falk, Against the Tyranny of
Paraphrase: Talking Back to Texts, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 163 (1993); Mary
Kate Kearney & Mary Beth Beazley, Teaching Students How to "Think Like
Lawyers:" Integrating Socratic Methods with the Writing Process, 64 TEMP. L.
REV. 885 (1991); Teresa Godwin Phelps, The New Legal Rhetoric, 40 S.W.L.J.
1089 (1986); Christopher Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing:A Revised

View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35 (1994).
6. See BOYD WHITE, supra note 3, at xii. Lawyers construct law every
time we speak or write using legal language. For example, when a scholar
writes an article that defines law in a certain way, she adds that layer of
definition to the conceptions of law that already exist. When lawyers write
briefs, argue or advise clients, they add that layer of definition to the
conceptions of law as practiced.
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Professor Baron's question is similarly an important one for
feminist law professors because of the danger that in our teaching,
we are reinforcing the patriarchal aspects of law that we critique
in our scholarship. What is the law that we teach? Who is the
lawyer in the phrase "thinking like a lawyer?" Is he a stereotype,
whose story, like the stories of the characters in Counsel for
Oedipus,7 can create dangerous misperceptions about law?' Are
biases embedded in either definition? Are we teaching the entire
picture of law, or a more narrow, less complete picture?
To begin the dialogue, I examine in this essay how legal
writing treats the teaching of narrative and emotion in law. These
are two topics that scholars, notably feminist scholars, frequently
view as "outside" law.9 I conclude that legal writing teaches more
about narrative and emotion in law than most traditional courses.
However, its tendency to treat the conservative, mainstream
bench and bar as the sole standard for good lawyering means that
students are likely to get a narrower view of narrative and
emotion in law than is entirely accurate or appropriate.
I hope that my introductory exploration of legal writing will
encourage other law teachers to ask the "what is law" question in
the context of their teaching and explore the boundaries that they
place on law when teaching their students.
Exploring this
question will help us challenge ourselves and our students to think
beyond a narrow, rigid vision of law and law practice.
I.

WHAT IS "THINKING (AND WRITING)

LIKE

A LAWYER" IN LEGAL

WRITING?

Legal writing has been constructed (and has constructed
itself) as a foil to its more theoretical, so-called doctrinal
counterparts in the first year.
Consequently, legal writing
professors take the responsibility to prepare students for the "real
world" of law practice seriously. In part, we accomplish this task
by placing practicing lawyers and judges at the center of our
pedagogy. When we teach, we define law for our students as what
practicing lawyers and judges do. So, for legal writing, there are
two important corollaries to Professor Baron's question: how do
legal writing professors define what practicing lawyers and judges
do and how do legal writing professors define who the members of
the bench and bar are?
Practicing lawyers and judges are at the heart of the two
primary methods of teaching legal writing in United States law

7. Frank O'Connor, Counsel for Oedipus, in LAW IN LITERATURE: LEGAL
THEMES IN SHORT STORIES 442 (Elizabeth Villers Gemmette ed., 1992).
8. See Jane B. Baron, Language Matters, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 163
(2000).
9. Id. at 167.
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schools: the process method and the social method.1" The process
method shows students what law is by teaching them to be aware
of and tailor the substance of communications to fit the audience
and purpose of the communications." A critical aspect of the
process method is the legal audience; the theory is that students
learn good lawyering skills when they internalize the needs,
questions and reasoning processes of a sophisticated legal
audience." The process method also defines the audience of most
legal documents as practicing lawyers or judges."
The social method emphasizes law as a discourse-of
language, community and culture. 4
Accordingly, it teaches
lawyering by simulation and immersion. Students learn legal
analysis by doing legal analysis, learn application of law by
applying it, and learn how to communicate analysis by writing and
speaking it.' The bench and bar are the "society" of the social
method; its goal is to socialize students into the community of the
bench and bar. For the social method, the language of law is what
lawyers and judges speak, the culture of law is the traditions and
customs of the practicing bench and bar, and the community
comprises practicing lawyers and judges.
Legal writing's reliance on the process and social methods
means that when legal writing professors teach-when we guide
and critique students' papers, arguments and analyses-we are
telling our students implicitly what a lawyer is and what the
culture and community of law is. In this way, we construct the
concepts of what "law," "lawyer" and "law practice" are for our
students.
For example, legal writing professors often guide
students from writing unsupported assertions of unfairness (a
common novice mistake) to writing arguments based on rules or
policy. Therefore, the sentence "it is unfair to prohibit a woman
from seeing the daughter she raised with her estranged lesbian
lover" becomes "to safeguard the best interests of the child, a
woman who has acted as a parent should have standing to sue for
partial custody of the daughter of her estranged lesbian lover."' 6
When we guide students from the first sentence to the second, we

10. See Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 52-65; Kathryn M. Stanchi,
Resistance is Futile: How Legal Writing Pedagogy Contributes to the Law's
Marginalizationof Outsider Voices, 103 DICK. L. REV. 1, 12-15 (1998).

11. Durako et al., supra note 4, at 722-23; Phelps, supra note 5, at 1094.
12. Kearney & Beazley, supra note 5, at 900-01.
13. Durako et al., supra note 4, at 728; LINDA HOLDEMAN EDWARDS, LEGAL
WRITING: PROCESS, ANALYSIS AND ORGANIZATION 244-45 (1996); HELENE S.
SHAPO ET AL., WRITING AND ANALYSIS IN THE LAW 73, 239 (3d ed. 1995).

14. BOYD WHITE, supra note 3, at xi; Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at
56-57.
15. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 56-57.
16. This example is drawn from an assignment created by my colleague,
Professor Elena Margolis. (source on file with author)
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implicitly tell them that the first sentence is not law and
second sentence is. Through this same critique, we tell
students what a lawyer is-a lawyer is someone who writes
will be influenced by the second sentence. 17 Finally, we show
students that the first sentence is not legal language, but
second sentence is.
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II. How LEGAL WRITING PEDAGOGY DEFINES LAW, LAWYERS, AND
LAW PRACTICE: BEGINNING THE DIALOGUE

Because legal writing implicitly defines law for its students
through reference to the community of practicing lawyers and
judges, it is important for legal writing professors to examine
explicitly how they define this community and its members. Who
is the audience/lawyer of the process method?" Who comprises the
community of the social method? To explore these two questions, I
will look at the treatment of narrative and emotion in legal writing
courses.
Interestingly, these two topics demonstrate that legal writing
teaches law that is both more expansive than the stereotype of law
that Professor Baron attributes to lawyers and, at the same time,
troubling close to that vision. 9 By teaching students to use
narrative and emotion in lawyering, legal writing shows students
that lawyering is much more than doctrine and rules. However,
examination of how these two topics are taught in legal writing
shows that legal writing pedagogy tends to define lawyers and
judges, and the practice of law, in a mainstream, narrow, and even
stereotypical way. In this way, legal writing pedagogy can create
boundaries and restrictions on law that, while partially accurate,
are not the sum of law.
Specifically, the boundaries may
discourage creative, deconstructive thinking in law practice and
exclude non-mainstream, outsider" thinking.
A. Storytelling in Legal Writing
Legal writing might be one of the few courses in law school
17. Our reasoning is that the audience/lawyer of the process method would
be more receptive to sentence two and that sentence two is in the standard
language of community/bar of the social method (and sentence one is in lay
language). Of course, overlap exists between the two complementary methods.
A legal audience would be more receptive to sentence two largely because it is
standard legal discourse.
18. Most legal writing texts do not explore this question beyond the
perfunctory description of the busy lawyer or judge who is unfamiliar with the
law and facts of a given case. See supra note 13.
19. Baron, Interdisciplinarity,supra note 1, at 1082-83.
20. The word "outsider" has become something of a term of art to describe
those who have been excluded from the creation and the practice of law. See
Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Legal Knowledge: Planting Seeds In
Plowed-Up Ground, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 n.2 (1988).
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that teaches the skill of crafting a story as an integral part of law.
Not many lawyers think of what they do with facts as
"storytelling" or "narrative," but no lawyer would deny the
importance of the skill, whatever one calls it, of telling the client's
story. Indeed, a favorite chestnut of the bar is "I'd rather have bad
law than bad facts," which emphasizes the importance of story
(facts) over doctrine. In law practice, this kind of storytelling does
not disrupt or challenge analysis; it is in many ways a critical part
of the analysis.2 Therefore, as part of teaching, students think
and write like lawyers, legal writing teaches (and has taught for
quite some time) students to craft compelling, cohesive, human
stories from the mechanical, nonemotional form that facts
frequently take in legal documents such as interrogatories and
pleadings."
Although there are certainly mechanical aspects to this kind
of legal storytelling, it is also a creative and strategic part of the
lawyering process. Many legal writing texts speak of drafting
facts sections in artistic terms-they speak of painting a picture
and of "the art of legal storytelling." 2 Legal writing teaches law
students to take control over the language of their stories-much
as authors do in composing fiction. As with composing a fictional
story, very little in the legal story should be haphazard or the
result of chance-written because "it just came out that way."
Rather, the writer should use language, structure and syntax to
create the precise picture she wants the reader to see. Thus,
students learn to think about and make (conscious) decisions
about what facts to include and exclude, in what order to present
them, and what vocabulary to use to describe the parties and
events. 4 In other 5words, legal writing teaches students that
"language matters."
For example, students learn in legal writing that they should
decide the order of facts strategically, to emphasize certain things
and de-emphasize others. Students begin to learn not only that
"all seeing derives from some perspective," but that perspectives

21. See Baron, Interdisciplinarity,supra note 1, at 1080 (quoting Martha

Minow who states that "stories disrupt... rationalizing, generalizing modes of
analysis.") In briefs, for example, the client's story appears in narrative form
in the Statement of Facts, but facts are almost always interspersed
throughout the document, in large part to remind the court of the human face
of the case. See NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 271 (reminding students that
judges are human beings who can be swayed by sympathetic facts).
22. Stanchi, supra note 10, at 14; NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 322-27;
EDWARDS, supranote 13, at 327.
23. NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 322 (quoting John W. Davis); EDWARDS,
supra note 13, at 328.
24. NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 322-27; EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 333-42.
25. Baron, Language Matters,supra note 8 at 163.
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can differ and can change the outcome of the case.26 They also
learn to use the writer's tools to persuade their audience to view a
story with a particular perspective.27 To do this, students can
allude to a fact early in a narrative without detailed explanation (a
legal equivalent of foreshadowing) or they can begin with a fact
out of chronological order and work back (somewhat like beginning
a story in media res). They learn to choose vocabulary carefully.
For example, using the word "girl" instead of "woman" can change
the meaning of a sentence, even the meaning of the story.28 In
sum, while some legal writing professors and texts might not use
or emphasize the word "narrative," because this is not common
parlance for most lawyers, the creation of stories is a large part of
teaching legal writing. 259 For legal writing professors, this kind of
narrative is already in law.
On the other hand, the storytelling that lawyers do and that
legal writing teaches is bound by doctrine in a way that personal
or fictional narrative is not. Legal storytelling is neither fictional
nor personal. ° It is the non-fictional account of someone else's
story and therefore lacks the catharsis, freedom and political
challenge of personal narratives.2 ' Moreover, in many ways the
audience of the process method and the legal community of the
social method confine the legal story. The lawyer/law student can
choose what facts to include or exclude only within the universe of
facts considered relevant by the audience and within the discourse
community. 2 The relevance of facts is dictated, in large part, by
rules. This constraint can be meaningful, especially with facts
relating to race, gender, sexual orientation and other outsider
characteristics. Moreover, the rules-and the power of stereotypes
over the audience-can also invite the legal writer to fall back on

26. Id. slip at 146.
27. See id (discussing power of "perspective"). See also EDWARDS, supra
note 13, at 328; NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 322 (quoting John W. Davis).
28. See Baron, Language Matters, supra note 8, at 163-74 (discussing use of
"girl" in line from Notting Hill).
29. See Baron, Interdisciplinarity,supra note 1, at 1083 (acknowledging the
view that lawyers must be effective "tellers of tales").
30. Except for the unfortunate lawyer who is his own client, the story the
lawyer gets to tell is not his own. Indeed, there is very little room for personal
expression in legal writing. The process method tells us that the purpose of
legal documents is not to express oneself-the feelings and personal views of
the writer must take a backseat to the goal of informing or persuading another
lawyer. Rideout & Ramsfield, supra note 5, at 52; SHAPO ET AL., supra note
13, at 264.
31. See Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971,
975 (1991); Jane B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation,and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J.
630, 666 (1992) (noting that one purpose of storytelling is to challenge
stereotypes and preconceptions in law).
32. Stanchi, supra note 10, at 30-35.
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"stock" stories or stereotypes in the narrative.3
Legal writing pedagogy usually reinforces the traditional,
more conservative view of the bench and bar that, as a general
rule, facts about the race or gender of the parties in a law suit are
not strictly relevant unless the legal issue depends on them, such
as in an employment discrimination or equal protection case.
Therefore, legal writing teaches students either to exclude these
irrelevant facts from the legal story, or use them only sparingly
and with caution. 4
Therefore, in a case about a young woman who is accused of
murdering her infant shortly after giving birth, legal writing
teaches that the audience (practicing lawyers and judges)
considers facts about the woman's ethnic background, her class
and her economic status irrelevant.35 Thus, the use of these facts
is circumscribed-they can be used sparingly for "context" or
emotional punch in the legal story, but cannot be the centerpiece
of it, at least not overtly. 6 These facts certainly should not be
given the same treatment as facts that are relevant to the legal
issues-such as whether the woman knew the baby was alive at
birth, whether she meant to kill the baby or only hide it, etcetera.
Thus, legal writing teaches students that facts relating to
ethnicity, poverty, and class are not really part of the law in this
case-unlike the facts about intent and knowledge, which are law.
Facts that are "really" law can be used throughout the piece of
legal writing, arguments may be based on them, they may be
covered in depth-the legal community acknowledges that they
belong in the legal story. Facts that are not law generally cannot
form the basis of legal arguments. They must be used, if at all,
sparingly and almost subliminally-they have to be slipped into
the legal story while the legal audience is paying attention to
something else.37
Moreover, in teaching students to use the writer's tools to
create a story with a particular perspective that is advantageous
33. Baron, Language Matters, supra note 8, 175 (citing Gerald Lopez, Lay
Lawyering, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1984)).
34. Stanchi, supra note 10, at 33-35.
35. This example is taken from an article by Professor Margaret Montoya.
See Margaret Montoya, Mascaras, Trenzas y Grenas: Un/Masking the Self
While Un/Braiding Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 185 (1994) (citing and discussing People v. Chavez, 176 P.2d 92 (Cal. App.
1947)).
36. Stanchi, supra note 10, at 33.
37. Overt use of facts about race, ethnicity or similar characteristics in a
case where they are not strictly relevant can make judges angry and have
unfortunate consequences for the client. See Clark D. Cunningham, The
Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of
Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1370, 1376-77 (1992) (describing a
judge's anger at a lawyer's attempt to argue facts related to race in a Fourth
Amendment case).
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to their clients, legal writing pedagogy, consistent with "real
world" lawyering, may sometimes encourage the use of "stock"
stories or stereotypes in legal narratives. 3 As Professor Baron
points out, stereotypes are part of the "mental equipment" with
which human beings "apprehend the social world."39 Since both
the writers and the audience of legal narratives are human beings,
it seems difficult (if not impossible) to create a legal narrative
without using them. Another reason is that legal narrative is tied
inextricably to legal doctrine-and legal doctrine (again being the
product of human beings) often seems to rely on stereotypes or
stock stories.40
In the story described by Professor Baron, Counsel for
Oedipus, the lawyers present the characters of the litigation in
stereotypical fashion-Nellie Lynam as the meek, downtrodden
wife, Tom Lynam as the overbearing, abusive, control-freak.
Later, Nellie Lynam is re-born as the manipulative, sex-hating
disgrace to her gender.4" Perhaps we can castigate the lawyers for
their contribution to the perpetuation of these stereotypes, but we
can also see how the stereotypical stories are encouraged by the
doctrine of domestic relations laws based on "fault," which relied
heavily on the stereotype that in every human relationship, there
is a good, innocent person and a bad, guilty person.42 However, as
Professor Baron points out, it makes little sense to "blame the law"
and stop there." Perhaps stereotypes "work" for lawyers-in the
story and in real life-not simply because the law encourages
them, but because the judge and the jury understand the
stereotypes and are, in some sense, comfortable with and
accepting of them. All of these considerations, of course, impact
the way legal writing teaches students to define and deal with the
legal audience.

38. I do not mean to suggest here that legal writing teaches that it is
acceptable or ethical to use racist, sexist or otherwise offensive stereotypeseven though some lawyers may interpret the professional responsibility of
zealous advocacy to require the use of such stories. But, as Professor Baron
points out, stereotypes abound in our minds and our culture-in many ways it
would be difficult to tell a coherent story without making use of them.
39. Baron, Language Matters, supra note 8, at 165.
40. Consider the "spontaneous utterance" rule of evidence (stock story:
excited people tend to tell the truth), the reasonable person/man of torts, the
classic victim and perpetrator of rape law. For a description of the stereotypes
underlying rape law, see, e.g., Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Paradox of the Fresh
Complaint Rule, 37 B.C.L. REV. 441 (1996); Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be
Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013 (1991)).
41. Baron, Language Matters, supra note 8, at 169-70.
42. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3702 (b)(14)(West 2000) (alimony
awarded in part based on one party's "misconduct" toward the other)
(amended 1998).
43. Baron, Language Matters, supra note 8, at 178-79.
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Thus, unlike some narrative legal scholarship, the
storytelling taught in legal writing generally supports, rather than
challenges, legal doctrine-in part because legal writing pedagogy
tends toward a (perhaps stereotyped) vision of the practicing bar
that is mainstream and conventional. This construction of law
fails to tell students that there are times when it is necessary and
perhaps even appropriate to argue overtly facts that are not
strictly relevant as a centerpiece to the legal theory, because it is
the right thing to do, is the best path to justice, or simply because
that is the client's story."
Or, that trying to fit clients or
adversaries into the stereotypes or stock stories underlying legal
doctrine is not always the best service to the client, and not always
ethically or morally right. Sometimes, as many believe was the
case with fault divorce, it is better to take the more radical step of
challenging the doctrine and the stereotypes on which it is based
and thereby challenging the audience's perceptions of what human
beings are really like.
B. Emotion in Legal Writing
Legal writing also teaches students how to use emotional
arguments in law and, consequently, that emotion is an important
part of law. Most legal writing texts emphasize to students that
judges and lawyers are human and have feelings; judges especially
want to be (or appear) fair and effect (and be viewed as effecting)
justice. 4' Although, as in classical rhetoric, law disfavors direct
appeals to emotion, most practicing lawyers would never
underestimate the power of a sympathetic client or circumstance
to determine the outcome of a dispute.4' Because it is a skill
crucial to practicing lawyers, legal writing teaches students to use
facts and arguments that appeal to the human side of judges.
Consider a case involving a widow suing her insurance
company for its refusal to pay her benefits because her husband
lied about his diabetes on the insurance application. 47
The
husband was murdered and therefore died for reasons completely
unrelated to his diabetic condition.4 8 Legal writing pedagogy
would encourage students representing the widow to make use of
44. See Cunningham, supra note 37, at 1329-30 (exploring times like this in
the life of a lawyer).
45. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 245; NEUMANN, supra note 4, at
271-72.
46. See EDWARD P.J. CORBETT, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN
STUDENT 86-87 (3d ed. 1990) (describing use of emotion in classical rhetoric).
The maxim quoted earlier, "I'd rather have bad law than bad facts," can also
be viewed to mean that it is better to have an emotionally strong case than a
doctrinally strong case. See also EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 245, 327 (noting

that a judge or jury will choose justice over technical application of law).
47. See State v. Manzo, 584 A.2d 190 (N.J. 1990).
48. Id. at 191.

2000]

Exploring the Law of Law Teaching: A Feminist Process

203

the emotional elements of the case in several ways. First,
"emotional" facts such as the widow's need for and reliance on the
insurance money, her lack of knowledge about her husband's
deception, and her unsuitability for employment because of her
age, gender and life-long devotion to her husband and family
should appear in the legal story, the Statement of Facts. 9
Second, legal writing pedagogy would encourage students to
construct a theory of the case that would allow them to maximize
the use of emotional facts and arguments. ° Some legal writing
texts go so far as to encourage students to begin a brief with a
summary that has human or emotional appeal. 1 Finally, legal
writing professors would encourage students to explore legal
arguments that would exploit the more sympathetic aspects of the
case. 52 For example, is an equity argument based on "clean hands"
or reliance possible?
On the other hand, both the process and social methods put
significant limits on the use of emotional arguments--emotion is
part of law, but in a hidden, embarrassed kind of way. The rules
of legal discourse require that the emotional arguments be made
indirectly, subtly-almost sneakily. Like facts that are not strictly
relevant, emotional arguments are not quite full members of the
legal community. They are not really law to the same degree as
doctrinal arguments and the law distrusts them. In the insurance
case, for example, legal writing pedagogy would strongly
discourage arguments that appeal directly to emotion, such as "the
wife should recover because she has had enough misfortune by
losing her husband in a terrible accident and the law should help
her" or "the wife should recover because in our society women who
have been homemakers are discriminated against by employers
and the wife will not be able to get a job and support herself."
These arguments are not part of traditional legal discourse and
the legal audience would consider these arguments unpersuasive,
unsupportable, and even inappropriate.
Here again, though, language matters and stereotypes loom.
Legal writing teaches that emotional arguments can be quite
powerful, but only if they are phrased in the proper way (to sound
like doctrine). The language used to make emotional appeals, such
as the vocabulary, tone, and sentence structure, can be the
difference between a successful emotional argument and an
embarrassing one. Moreover, are appeals to emotion in law just a
more intellectual way of recasting the use (and possibly abuse) of
49. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 327-28; NEUMANN, supra note 4,

at 320-21, 323-24.
50. See, e.g.,
51. See, e.g.,
52. See, e.g.,
INTRODUCTION

NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 263, 271-72, 365.
id. at 273; EDWARDS, supra note 13, at 334.
NEUMANN, supra note 4, at 271-73; NANCY L. SCHULTZ, ET AL.,
TO LEGAL WRITING AND ORAL ADVOCACY 223 (2d ed. 1993).
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stereotypes?
Are some emotions just "gut reactions" to
stereotypes-like the reactions of moviegoers (even feminist
moviegoers) to Julia Roberts' happily married and pregnant
character in Notting Hill? What are lawyers doing when they try
to appeal to the emotions of their audience?
Part of what the social and process methods teach students is
that emotion is part of law, but it is also in some sense not quite
law. While this proposition may be true much of the time, it is a
view of law practice that is very traditional and conservative. It
ignores those marginal, novel cases (usually for marginalized
clients) where doctrinal precedent is scarce, and the most useful,
effective thing to do is make an argument that appeals baldly to
the court's feelings about justice and fairness."
To be wellrounded, capable and creative lawyers, students need to learn both
how to do this and when it might be appropriate. On the other
hand, to paraphrase Professor Baron, it is difficult to control the
reaction of the audience to an emotional appeal, even an artfully
crafted one.54 It is far from clear that appeals to emotion are
somehow more feminist, or less burdened by stereotypes, than
purely doctrinal arguments.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

The two examples of storytelling and emotion in legal writing
demonstrate the importance of asking the "what is law" question
in what we teach. For legal writing, two primary corollary
questions emerge upon close examination of the process and social
pedagogies. First, who exactly is the audience/lawyer of the
process method? Does this entity have a race, gender, sexual
orientation, or class? What does it say about the audience to
whom we are speaking when we teach our students that in a legal
dispute certain personal characteristics are irrelevant because the
audience would consider them irrelevant? What does it say about
the audience when we treat emotion as a thing to be hidden or
embarrassed about because of our audience?
Second, what exactly are the characteristics and qualities of
the legal culture and community central to the social method? To
answer "the practicing bench and bar" only begs the question.
Who do we see as the members of the practicing bench and bar?
What does the treatment of facts related to race, gender and
sexual orientation say about our vision of the practicing bench and
bar? Do all members of the community agree that emotional
arguments should (always) be camouflaged as doctrine or policy?

53. The bar has a maxim that seems on point for these cases, too: if you
have good facts, pound the facts; if you have good law, pound the law; if you
have neither, pound the table.
54. Baron, Language Matters, supra note 8, 168.
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Are emotional arguments always more feminist than purely
doctrinal ones?
These questions are meant to begin the process of applying
Professor Baron's question to law pedagogy. I see this as a
feminist process in that it will lead us to explore beyond artificially
constructed (and perhaps sexist, racist and homophobic)
definitions of law. In teaching students to think like lawyers, law
professors are constructing what lawyers are (indeed, constructing
lawyers) and therefore, are constructing law. Law professors must
guard against treating the boundaries of law and law practice as
fixed and inflexible, as always narrow, rigid, anti-feminist and
racist. For legal writing, this idea means being careful not to
define the "practicing bar" in an exclusively mainstream,
conservative way. That conservative viewpoint can be part of
what is taught, but it cannot be the only part. If legal writing
professors limit themselves to this narrow picture of the law,
students may not learn to push the boundaries, to think creatively,
and to deconstruct within the context of law practice. To truly
educate students, legal writing professors must also teach them
that "thinking like a lawyer" can mean what a good, creative
lawyer who is challenging the system might think and do. This
way, students can enter law practice knowing that creativity and
deconstruction are not solely scholarly activities, but are usefuleven essential-to good lawyering. As Professor Larson noted in
one of her articles:
[T]he law already contains within it the seeds of
[feminist] transformation ... feminist practitioners
[must] develop skill in finding analogies that can create a
path for judges and legislators between [women's]
present reality and ... future vision.55
How can students as future practitioners develop these skills?
Only if we teach them.

55. Jane B. Larson, Introduction: Third Wave-Can Feminists Use the Law
to Effect Social Change in the 1990s?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1252, 1259 (1993)
(summarizing the thesis of Jennifer Nedelsky's article, The Practical
Possibilitiesof Feminist Theory, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1286 (1993)).

